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CRIMINAL LAW
OVERVIEW
"Steady as she goes" was obviously the motto of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals during the period of time covered by this survey arti-
cle. The Tenth Circuit neither wandered far afield from previous deci-
sions nor forged ahead into unknown legal waters. As a result, the cases
examined in this article were chosen more for their factual intrigue than
for the legal significance of the court's reasoning.
The survey article covers two areas of criminal law: habeas corpus
proceedings and convictions on appeal. The habeas corpus section dis-
cusses two cases representing opposite extremes in how juveniles are
treated. In the first case, the Tenth Circuit granted the writ of habeas
corpus. The court held that a juvenile's right to parental notice of his
criminal offense is a right which is not waivable by a juvenile offender,
even where the right was not recognized by the courts at the time the
right was allegedly waived. In the second case, the Tenth Circuit denied
the writ of habeas corpus, holding that a juvenile who violates his parole
loses any rights he may have been entitled to under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act.
The second section, covering convictions on appeal, discusses three
convictions, two of which were vacated by the Tenth Circuit. In the first
case, the court vacated a conviction for making a threat to kill the Presi-
dent. In the second case, the court reviewed the heat of passion defense
and vacated the conviction based on the inadequacy of the jury instruc-
tions relating to the defense. Finally, the court upheld a conviction
while applying the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) to the activities of a county sheriff.
I. HABEAS CORPUS
A. Juvenile Rights in Criminal Courts
1. History of the Juvenile Court Movement in the United States
The Juvenile Court movement in the United States began with the
juvenile court statute adopted in Illinois in 1899.1 Since the passage of
that statute every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have
enacted similar statutes.
2
The move to create a juvenile court system through statutory
change was a reaction to unacceptable conditions in the handling of
young criminals. Early reformers were dismayed by the adult criminal
1. 1899 111. Laws 131; see 2 G. ABBOTr, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 330 (1938); R.
PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 940-949 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter PERKINS & BOYCE];
Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L. Q. REV. 364 (1937).
2. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 940; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
procedures and penalties to which children were subjected.3 Equally
appalling was the fact that children received long prison sentences and
were placed in jails with hardened criminals. 4 Reformers believed that
society's role was not to ascertain a child's guilt or innocence, but rather
to discover "[w]hat is he, how has he become what he is, and what had
best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him
from a downward career." 5 Using adult criminal procedures for chil-
dren was viewed negatively.6 These people thought the child was essen-
tially good and should be made "to feel that he is the object of [the
state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or on trial.
7
They wished to abandon the idea of crime and punishment in favor of
treatment and rehabilitation.
8
The reformers felt that the state, acting in its role as parens patriae,
had a right to deny to the child procedural rights available to adults. 9
The state's right to deny due process evolved from the theory that a
child had a right to custody, but not liberty.' 0 If the child's parents
failed to supervise and care for the child, the state could intervene on his
behalf." Through intervention, the state provided the supervision to
which the child was entitled. 12 By characterizing juvenile proceedings
as "civil" and not "criminal," these proceedings were then not governed
by the same constitutional requirements of due process as mandated in
adult criminal proceedings.
13
The justification for this denial of due process was that the benefits
received by juveniles from these special proceedings outweighed the
constitutional guarantees of conventional criminal proceedings.
14
These benefits included processing and treating the juvenile separately
from adults,' 5 keeping confidential the juvenile's record of deviant be-
havior,16 and classifying the juvenile as a "delinquent" and not a "crim-
inal."1 7 In addition, the classification of the child as a delinquent would
not affect his eligibility for civil service appointment.'
8
3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
4. Id.
5. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-120 (1909).
6. Id. at 120.
7. Id.
8. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
9. Id. at 17; see also Mack, supra note 5, at 109. Parens Patriae, translates into "parent
of the country," and refers to the traditional role of the sovereign as "guardian of persons
under a legal disability." BLACKs LAw DICrIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979) (quoting State of
W. Va. v. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971)).
10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Appendix B to the opinion ofJudge Prettyman in Pee v. United States,
274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (listing of constitutional guarantees which do not apply to
juvenile proceedings).
14. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21.
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at 23.
18. Id. at 24.
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These benefits, however, were also accompanied by increased juve-
nile misbehavior, violence, and brutality.' 9 Studies were conducted
showing a high percentage of repeat juvenile offenders. 20 These high
percentages and the increased crime rate led some people to believe
that the juvenile system, functioning free of constitutional inhibitions,
was ineffective in reducing crime or rehabilitating offenders.
2 '
Studies attacking the basic premise of the juvenile system - a fa-
therly judge or a benevolent institution providing guidance and help to
an erring youth - began to appear. 22 These studies pointed out that
fairness and impartiality, rather than paternal advice and admonition,
would have a more inspiring and rehabilitative impact on the juvenile.
23
For example, sociologists Wheeler and Cottrell noted that the contrast
between the paternal attitude of the judge as adjudicator and the impar-
tial attitude of the judge as disciplinarian may adversely affect the
child.2 4 The child may feel that he has been betrayed.2 5 Wheeler and
Cottrell reasoned that "[u]nless appropriate due process of law is fol-
lowed," the juvenile "may not feel that he is being fairly treated and may
therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel."
'26
Studies such as these, as well as the apparent inability of the juve-
nile court system to reduce the juvenile crime rate, led to the landmark
decision of In re Gault.27 The Supreme Court held that in a juvenile
delinquency hearing the following must occur:
19. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 944. According to the National Crime Commis-
sion Report, "[i]n 1965, persons under 18 accounted for about one-fifth of all arrests for
serious crimes and over half of all arrests for serious property offenses, and in the same
year some 601,000 children under 18, or 2% of all children between 10 and 17, came
before juvenile courts." In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20 n.26 (citing Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice, "The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society," 55 (1967) [hereinafter National Crime Commission Report]).
20. A study of repeat offenders or recidivism was conducted by the Stanford Research
Institute for the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. The Court,
quoting the Commission's Report, stated:
In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16- and 17-year-old juveniles re-
ferred to the court by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previ-
ously. In 1965, 56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. The
SRI study revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965
had been previously referred at least once and that 42 percent had been referred
at least twice before.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id.
24. Id.; seeJUVENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL (Russell Sage Foun-
dation 1966) [hereinafter JUVENILE DELINQUENCY] (juveniles are likely to resent uneven
court treatment). Quoting this study, conducted by Wheeler and Cottrell, the Court
stated:
[T]here is increasing evidence that the informal procedures, contrary to the origi-
nal expectation, may themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective treat-
ment of the delinquent to the extent that they engender in the child a sense of
injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of au-
thority by judges and probation officers.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26 n.3 7 .
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26 (citingJUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 24, at 33).
26. Id.
27. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 947.
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1. The juvenile must have timely notice of the specific issues
he must address.
2. The child and his parents must be notified of the child's
right to be represented by counsel. If he is unable to afford
counsel, he must have counsel appointed to represent him.
3. The juvenile has the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him.
4. The court has a duty to advise the child of his privilege
against self-incrimination, and this right to counsel. The
court may not consider any confession or admission if such
advice has not been given.
2 8
The Court took great pains to emphasize that the requirement of these
procedural safeguards was not, in any way, to repudiate the basic theory
of juvenile legislation.2 9 The methods of avoiding undue publicity of
the trial and treatment ofjuveniles would remain part of the law's policy
"to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them
in the graveyard of the forgotten past."
3 0
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: Ball v. Ricketts
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Ball v. Ricketts 3 1 focused on the ret-
roactive application of the rights recognized in Gault. The court held
that the rights to parental notice recognized in Gault were not waivable
by a juvenile offender, even though the Gault rights were not recognized
by courts at the time they were allegedly waived.
3 2
Richard Lee Ball was charged with being a habitual criminal under
Colorado's habitual criminal statute. 33 If a person has three prior felony
convictions, the Colorado statute requires a sentence of life imprison-
ment.34 In determining whether Ball was a habitual criminal, the jury
heard evidence concerning Ball's commission of four prior felonies,
3 5
including a burglary, to which Ball had pleaded guilty in 1957 in Colo-
rado state court.
3 6
Ball petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to set aside his conviction
as a habitual criminal. 3 7 As a basis for his petition, Ball relied on the
circumstances surrounding his 1957 guilty plea.3 8 In 1957, Ball was six-
teen years old but claimed that he was seventeen.3 9 Additionally, he lied
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-57.
29. Id. at 21. The Court stated that "the observance of due process standards, intelli-
gently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace
any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Id.; see also Note, Rights and Rehabil-
itation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COL. L. REv. 281 (1967).
30. State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 430, 120 P.2d 798, 802 (1942).
31. 779 F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Riveland v. Ball, 107 S. Ct. 236
(Oct. 6, 1986).
32. Id. at 581.
33. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-13-101(2) (1973).
34. d.







to the court when he explained that his parents were aware that he was
in jail.40 Ball also refused the court's offer to appoint an attorney to
assist him.4 1 In contending that his conviction was invalid, Ball asked
the court to consider these factors, as well as the transcript of his 1957
arraignment, and his current testimony that he was unable to under-
stand the charges and court procedures at the time he pleaded guilty.
42
The district court granted the writ, which was immediately appealed to
the Tenth Circuit by the State of Colorado.
43
Because Ball was sixteen at the time of the disputed guilty plea, the
Tenth Circuit could not uphold the 1957 state court decision.4 4 The
court, following Gault, recognized that "special procedural protections"
were required in juvenile court proceedings. 4 5 One such procedural
protection was giving notice of the offense to ajuvenile's parents.4 6 The
court noted that the record was silent as to whether Ball's parents were
notified that their son was incarcerated or that an arraignment hearing
was being held. 4 7 In rendering its decision, the court also considered
the allegation that Ball had never told his parents about his arrest.
48
The Tenth Circuit indicated that, because Ball had lied to him
about his age, the state court judge should also have assumed that Ball
was not telling the truth about whether his parents knew he was in jail.49
In light of the fact that there were no special procedural protections in
the 1957 juvenile process, the court thought it understandable that the
state court judge failed to take further precautions to protect Ball's in-
terests. 50 Nevertheless, the court held that notice to the juvenile's par-
ents is a right that could not be waived, regardless of whether the right
was recognized by the courts at that time.
5 '
The Tenth Circuit justified its opinion by citing cases where the
rights recognized in Gault have been retroactively applied. 52 The court
recognized that in these cases, the rights, or rather, the absence of the
40. Id. The 10th Circuit court observed that this statement may have been a
fabrication. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Ball also asserted that his guilty plea was involuntary and that his waiver of
counsel was ineffective. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 580.
45. Id.; see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967).
46. Ball, 779 F.2d at 580.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court stated: "We realize that Ball told the state court judge conducting
his arraignment that his parents knew he was in jail; but he also told the judge that they
were taking no steps to get him out or to obtain an attorney for him." Id.
50. Id. at 580-81.
51. Id. at 581. Ball was arraigned in 1957, and the In re Gault decision was handed
down in 1967.
52. Id.; see United States v. Slipka, 735 F.2d 1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 1984) (juvenile's
right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceeding); Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169,
175-77 (4th Cir. 1970) (juvenile's right to counsel and notice in juvenile jurisdiction waiver
proceeding); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396-97 (10th Cir. 1968) (juvenile's right to
counsel in involuntary commitment proceeding).
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rights, "affect[ed] the integrity of the truth-finding process." 53 In Ball,
the court thought it likely that, if the parents had been notified of their
son's arrest, the parents would have attempted to help him.54 Thus, the
court concluded that the absence of proper notice may have "affected
the ultimate outcome" of Ball's case.
5 5
3. Analysis and Conclusion
In Ball, the Tenth Circuit failed to address whether "affecting the
integrity of the truth-finding process" 5 6 was the same standard as "af-
fecting the ultimate outcome of the case."' 57 By implication, the appel-
late court has declared that these two standards are the same. 58 By
analytical reasoning, however, one could conclude that these two stan-
dards are not the same. For example, lying on the witness stand affects
the integrity of the truth-finding process. Yet, this lie may or may not
affect the ultimate outcome of the case. 59 Therefore, by failing to ad-
dress the relationship between the two standards, the court's decision
may have limited precedential impact.
60
The Tenth Circuit did, however, demonstrate the importance of
due process and its constitutional requirements whenever a juvenile is
involved in a criminal court proceeding. The decision appears to indi-
cate that the Tenth Circuit would seriously consider retroactive applica-
tion of any of the rights recognized in Gault, if the rights or absence of
the rights would have an impact on the truth-finding process or on the
outcome of the case.
53. Ball, 779 F.2d at 581.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court stated that "[t]he rights recognized in Gault have been applied ret-
roactively in a variety of settings because they affect the integrity of the truth-finding pro-
cess." Id.
57. The court stated that "the lack of such notice [in Ball] may well have affected the
ultimate outcome of the case .... But the rights to parental notice that Gault created are
not waivable by a juvenile offender." Id.
58. The court held that the In re Gault rights should be applied retroactively where to
do so would affect the outcome of the case; by citing cases where the rights recognized in
In re Gault have been applied retroactively because they affect the integrity of the truth-
finding process, the Tenth Circuit has implied that the two standards are the same. Id.
59. See generally F. DINKINES, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 36-53 (1964).
Putting the court's reasoning in mathematical terms can show the invalid inference of the
court more clearly. The court held, basically that if an absence of the In re Gault rights
affects the integrity of the truth-finding process, then the In re Gault rights should be retro-
actively applied, which can be represented as if "A, then B." The court also held that if
such an absence affects the ultimate outcome of the case, then it should be retroactively
applied, or if "C, then B." Then, by using the cases of the first proposition to support its
second proposition, the court drew the inference that A = C, which is not a valid inference
to draw.
60. Because the court never gave guidance as to what happens when the integrity of
the truth-finding process is affected but the outcome of the case is not affected, nor what
happens when the situation is reversed, one must be careful in using this case as a prece-
dent for retroactive application of rights, unless there is no doubt that the ultimate outcome




B. Mandates of the Federal Youth Corrections Act
1. History of the Act
Enacted in 1950, the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA)6 1 was a
reaction to the inordinate amount of crime committed by youthful of-
fenders62 and the obvious breakdown of the modern penal system in
attempting to rehabilitate these young men and women. 63 The YCA in-
creased the sentencing alternatives for youthful offenders by specifying
treatment 64 in certain facilities 6 5 separated from the harmful influence
of adult inmates.6 6 Under the YCA, an offender usually received an in-
determinate sentence, not to exceed six years. 6 7 The guidelines for re-
habilitation mandated by the YCA were regarded as "comprising the
quidpro quo for a longer confinement but under different conditions and
terms than a defendant would undergo in an ordinary prison."
68
The YCA was repealed in 198469 in an attempt to provide for com-
prehensive and consistent sentencing for similarly situated offenders.
70
Behind Congress' action was the doubt that rehabilitation could be in-
duced reliably in a prison setting and the certainty that no one could
really detect whether or when a prisoner was actually rehabilitated. 7 1
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: Scott v. United States
Even though the YCA was repealed, courts are still addressing the
issues which have been generated by the statute. The Tenth Circuit
faced one of these issues in Scott v. United States.7 2 The question in Scott
was whether an offender sentenced under the YCA, who violated his
parole, had a right to the same equitable remedy as offenders who have
61. Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1982) (repealed 1984).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 5006 (1982) (repealed 1984). "Youth offender" is defined in the Act
as "a person under the age of twenty-two years at the time of conviction." Id. at § 5006(d).
63. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974); Watts v. Hadden, 651
F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir.), reh'g denied, 686 F.2d 841 (1981); H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1950); Note, Sentencing of Youthful Misdemeanants Under the Youth Correc-
tions Act: Eliminating Disparities Cr ated by the Federal iagistrate Act of 1979, 51 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1254 (1983) [hereinafter Sentencing Misdemeanants].
64. 18 U.S.C. § 5006 (1982) (repealed 1984). "Treatment" is defined in the Act as
"corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by cor-
recting the anti-social tendencies of youth offenders." Id. at § 5006(f).
65. 18. U.S.C. § 5011 (1982) (repealed 1984). The YCA required that "[i]nsofar as
practical, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for treatment of committed
youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders" and
from each other according to their treatment needs. Id.
66. See Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 207-08 (1981); Watts, 651 F.2d at 1354,
1357, 1365; Sentencing Misdemeanants, supra note 63, at 1255.
67. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b), 5017(c) (1982). An indeterminate sentence was given re-
gardless of the maximum sentence an adult could serve for the very same offense. See
Sentencing Misdemeanants, supra note 63, at 1255.
68. Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
69. Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1840 (1984).
70. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3182, 3220-23.
71. Id. at 3221.
72. 778 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1985).
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not violated the terms of their parole.
73
In 1979, Ricardo Scott was convicted of burglary. 74 He was sen-
tenced under the YCA 75 to a 0-6 year indeterminate term. 76 Scott was
imprisoned at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) at Lompoc,
California. 7 7 The FCI at Lompoc did not segregate YCA offenders from
adult inmates.
78
In 1981, Scott was paroled. 79 Also in 1981, the Tenth Circuit ruled
that administrators could not hold youthful offenders sentenced under
the YCA in institutions which failed to separate such youths from adult
inmates.8 0 The court held that the benefits of the YCA would be denied
to youthful offenders if there was no separation between the youths and
older inmates.
8 '
Subsequently, the parole board held a revocation hearing in Janu-
ary of 1984.82 The board revoked Scott's parole and reinstated his orig-
inal sentencing term.8 3 Scott was incarcerated at the FCI at Englewood,
Colorado until September of 1984.84 He was then transferred to the
FCI at Lompoc, where he remained until his sentence expired in June of
1985.85 At no time since his parole revocation hearing was Scott incar-
cerated with adult inmates in violation of the YCA.
8 6
Scott filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that he
was entitled to good-time credits on his sentence for the period of time
that he was incarcerated at the FCI in Lompoc in violation of the YCA.
8 7
The United States District Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition88
and Scott appealed.
8 9
In affirming the district court's dismissal, the Tenth Circuit reaf-
firmed its earlier holding in Staudmier v. United States9" that allowing
good-time credits for time served in an unsegregated facility was "tech-
nically inconsistent with the YCA framework." 9 1 The court also recog-
73. Id. at 1445.
74. Id.






80. Watts v. United States, 651 F.2d 1354, 1366 (10th Cir. 1981). The court was
directing its holding to the Bureau of Prisons.
81. Id.
82. Scott, 778 F.2d at 1445. The hearing was held to consider Scott's burglary convic-






87. The period of time that Scott was incarcerated with adult inmates in violation of
the YCA was from November of 1974 until March of 1981. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 496 F.2d 1191 (10th Cir. 1974).
91. Scott, 778 F.2d at 1446 (citing Staudmier, 496 F.2d at 1192). An offender sentenced
[Vol. 64:2
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nized the appropriateness of granting such credits as an equitable
remedy where the youth sentenced under the YCA was deprived of any
of its benefits.
9 2
Because the allowance of good-time credits is an equitable remedy,
the court stated that it "should only be granted where 'in equity and
conscience' the petitioner is so entitled. ' '9 3 The Tenth Circuit went on
to agree with the district court's conclusion that the equities did not
favor the granting of such relief.9 4 By violating his parole, Scott was not
entitled to equitable relief, and therefore, could not receive good-time
credits for time already served. 95
3. Conclusion
In Scott v. United States, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of stat-
utory rights of a juvenile and the conditions under which those rights
may be lost. By holding that good-time credits can be forfeited if one
violates his parole, the court gave an example of a situation where a
statutory right can be lost. The court's decision serves as a reminder
that statutory rights, in contrast to constitutional rights, are not
guaranteed.
II. CONVICTIONS ON APPEAL
A. Making a Threat to Kill the President
1. Background
The statute imposing criminal liability for making a threat to kill the
President is located at 18 U.S.C. § 871.96 The statute states:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits ... any letter... con-
taining any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bod-
ily harm upon the President . .. or knowingly and willfully
otherwise makes any such threat against the President... shall
be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
9 7
The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to interpret this stat-
ute. In Watts v. United States,98 the Supreme Court held that section 871
requires that a "true threat" must have been made.99 In Watts, the
Court reversed the conviction of an 18-year-old who allegedly
under the YCA is not eligible for good-time credit since the indicator for early release is
not the sentence as reduced by good time, but demonstrated progress toward rehabilita-
tion. See Staudmier, 496 F.2d at 1192.
92. Scott, 778 F.2d at 1446 (citingJohnson v. Rodgers, 756 F.2d 79 (10th Cir. 1985)).
93. Id. at 1446 (citing Johnson, 756 F.2d at 81).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Threats Against President and Successors to the Presidency, 18 U.S.C. § 871
(1982).
97. Id.
98. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
99. Id. at 708.
1987]
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threatened to kill President Lyndon Johnson.10 0 The alleged threat oc-
curred during a discussion of police brutality and the draft, following a
rally at the Washington Monument.' 0 ' The Court classified the com-
ment as "political hyperbole," which did not constitute a true threat.
10 2
In deciding the case, however, the Court declined to address whether
the government must prove actual intent to carry out the threat.'
0 3
Since Watts, the statute has been interpreted by several circuit
courts. The Second Circuit has held that, in order to show that the
speech in question is not protected by the first amendment, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that a threat "according to [its] language and
context conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution so as to
constitute speech beyond the pale of protected 'vehement, caustic ...
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.' ",104
The Fourth Circuit has held that when a "threat against the person of
the President is uttered without communication to the President in-
tended, the threat can form a basis for conviction under . . . section
871(a) only if made with a present intention to do injury to the Presi-
dent."' 1 5 The Tenth Circuit has held that a defendant can be convicted
under section 871 without proof of actual intent to carry out the
threat.1
0 6
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Crews
The Tenth Circuit examined section 871 in United States v. Crews. 10 7
In the opinion, the court reiterated that section 871 does not require
intent to kill the President. The court held, however, that a "true
threat" was made by Crews, but it vacated his conviction on other
grounds.1
0 8
Marvin Arnesto Crews, Jr., was a patient in the psychiatric ward of
the Veteran's Hospital in Sheridan, Wyoming. 10 9 He was extremely up-
set after watching several evening television programs and was, thus,
administered a large dose of antidepressant medication."10 Crews
100. Id. at 705-06.
101. Id. at 708.
102. Id. at 707-08.
103. Id. at 708.
104. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added) (quoting
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976.)
105. United States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293, 297-98 (4th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added),
aff'den banc, 438 F.2d 13 (1971).
106. United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Dysart,
705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 861 (1972).
107. 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1986).
108. Id. at 835-36. The Tenth Circuit vacated Crews' conviction on the basis of his fifth
claim: that the district court wrongly refused to appoint a psychiatrist to aid defendant's
attorney.
109. Id. at 829.
110. Id. Crews watched the television broadcast of "The Day After," a movie depicting
the nuclear destruction of a midwestern town, Lawrence, Kansas. Warnings about the dis-
turbing nature of the movie's content accompanied the presentation. A televised panel
discussing the movie's implications followed the movie. Being extremely upset after
[Vol. 64:2
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stated to a nurse "[i]f Reagan came to Sheridan, I would shoot him."' Il
After the nurse reported this statement to her superiors, the hospital
contacted the Secret Service.
112
Crews was indicted for making a threat to kill President Ronald Rea-
gan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871.1 l 3 He was found guilty by a jury
and sentenced to four years in prison. 1 4 On appeal, Crews claimed that
the purported threat came within a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
that the statement came within the protection of the first amendment as
political speech, and that the court erred by not instructing the jury that
Crews must have intended to carry out his threat."1 5 The Tenth Circuit
disagreed with all of these claims.' 16
Crews claimed that his statement to the nurse, the purported threat,
was privileged communication between a psychotherapist and the pa-
tient. 117 The Tenth Circuit, having never addressed the privilege be-
tween a psychotherapist and a patient, again declined to decide whether
to adopt the privilege.1 8 The court stated, " [e]ven if we were to recog-
nize it, we would have to hold that defendant waived his right to the
privilege."'l9 The court did not formally recognize the privilege,120 but
argued that Crews had waived any privilege he might have had, because
he had openly discussed the comment that he made to the nurse with
the Secret Service Agent.
12 1
watching both programs, Crews requested sedatives from one of the hospital's psychiatric
nurses.
111. Id. at 829-30. Crews denied making that precise statement, but admitted an ex-
treme dislike for President Reagan. Crews claimed to have told the nurse that it "would be
in the best interest of this nation if that red-necked, bigoted, war-mongering mother-
fucker were shot." Id. at 830. In addition, it was found that Crews owned a shotgun and a
rifle as well as several other weapons. Crews had these weapons and other personal prop-
erty delivered to him from a hospital in Garden City, Kansas, where he had received prior
treatment. Apparently Crews had requested their delivery before the purported threat, but
the exact time as to when he arranged for the weapons to be sent was unclear. Crews did
not have control over the weapons at the Veteran's Hospital, but if he had left the hospital,
he could have taken the weapons with him. Id. at 830 n.1.
112. Id. at 829-30.
113. Id. at 829.
114. Id.
115. Id. Crews also claimed that (1) the prosecution failed to satisfy its burden to prove
defendant was sane at the time of the alleged threat; (2) the district court erred in denying
defendant a competency hearing and in not making findings required by statute; (3) that
the district court wrongly refused to appoint a psychiatrist to aid defendant's attorney; and
(4) cross-examination of the psychiatrists who examined defendant to determine compe-
tency violated the evidentiary rules.
116. Id. at 835-36. The Tenth Circuit did agree with one of the defendant's conten-
tions, vacated his conviction, and remanded for a new trial.
117. Id. at 830. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not recognize a psychotherapist-
patient privilege explicitly. See FED. R. EvID. 501. Some federal courts have adopted it.
See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 638-39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 426 (1983); see
generally Note, Evidence - The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege - The Sixth Circuit Does the Decent
Thing: In re Zuniga, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 385 (1985).
118. Crews, 781 F.2d at 830-31.
119. Id. at 831.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 581 F. Supp. 51, 52-53
(W.D. Okla. 1982); United States v. Mierzwicki, 500 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (D. Md. 1980)
(disclosure of privileged communication is a waiver of privilege).
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Crews also claimed that his statement was political speech protected
by the first amendment. 12 2 The Tenth Circuit disagreed and found that
Crews' statement was more like a common threat made in cases of extor-
tion.' 25 Although the statement followed a panel discussion and televi-
sion program with political overtones and concerned a political figure, it
was reasonably clear to the court that Crews was not engaged in political
advocacy. 1
2 4
The court also discussed whether the instruction given to the jury
sufficiently informed the jury as to the content of an unprotected
threat. 12 5 The instruction given to the jury was that "[a] threat is a
statement expressing an intent to kill or injure the President, and a true
threat means a serious threat as distinguished from words uttered as
mere political argument, talk, or jest.' 1 26 The Tenth Circuit was satis-
fied that this instruction adequately informed the jury of the difference
between protected political speech and unprotected threats.
127
The final argument made by Crews was that the court erred in in-
structing the jury that defendant could be convicted absent proof of an
intention to carry out the threat. 12 8 Because the Tenth Circuit had re-
jected the same substantive contention in earlier cases, the court again
rejected the idea that the government must prove intent.' 2 9 The court
reasoned that "[t]he statute speaks of the requirement being that the
threat is 'knowingly and willfully' made, and, of course, it must be made
in terms of a 'true threat'.'..30 The majority rejected Crew's conten-
tion that the statute requires proof of intent when the threat is not made
directly to the President or in such a manner as to reach him or his se-
curity personnel.' 1
3
3. The Opinion of Judge Logan
Judge Logan concurred with the majority opinion except for the
question of whether section 871 requires intent for conviction.' 3 2 If a
122. Crews, 781 F.2d at 830-31.
123. Id. at 832. The court found the statement analogous to that made in United States
v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 615-16, 618 (10th Cir. 1984). In Welch the defendant, distraught
about the unavailability of vocational training, stated that he would kill President Reagan if
he had the opportunity. The court found that the first amendment did not protect the
statement. See also United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (5th Cir. 1983) (state-
ment that "It's too bad thatJohn Hinkley did not get him. I will kill the President ifI get a
chance" not protected by first amendment), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2683 (1985); United
States v. Lincoln, 589 F.2d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1979) (letter containing explicit threats un-
protected by the first amendment).
124. Crews, 781 F.2d at 832; see also Welch, 745 F.2d at 618-19.
125. Crews, 781 F.2d at 832.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 834-35.
129. Id. at 835; see United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 861 (1972).
130. Crews, 781 F.2d at 835.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 836 (Logan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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threat was made directly to the President, or in such a way that one
could reasonably expect that it would reach the President or those
charged with his protection, then Judge Logan agreed that the govern-
ment need not prove that a defendant actually intended to carry out the
threat.13 3 However, if a threat was made that was not intended to reach
the President or his security personnel, and in such a manner that it was
highly unlikely to be so communicated, then Judge Logan found that it
would be necessary for the government to prove intent. 134
Judge Logan stated that, when a threat against the President was
made to a companion, or, as in the Crews' case, the declarant's psychiat-
ric nurse, the statement was probably idle chatter or political criti-
cism.' 35 Second, by punishing the utterance of a statement without
further proof of intent to carry out the threatened action, Logan be-
lieved that the court would be bordering on punishing mens rea alone
- punishing an individual for merely having evil thoughts. 136 Finally,
Judge Logan argued that a threatening comment made to one not in-
tended to relay the message, and under circumstances where it was im-
probable that the comment would be so communicated, could not




On the surface, Judge Logan's arguments sound logical, but after
closer examination one can clearly see the difficulties. In his first argu-
ment, Judge Logan gave no support for his comment that the declarant's
statement "is much more likely to be idle talk or political commen-
tary."13 8 He claimed that "[w]e must recognize this is so," even though
he approved of charging the jury that it must measure the "true" nature
of the threat by how the hearer would interpret it. 13 9
Second, it is clear that the statute punishes the utterance of a threat
and not just the thinking of evil thoughts.140 Because it is the President
which is the subject of the threat, mere voicing of the evil thoughts in
the form of a threat is enough to warrant protection through imposition
of criminal liability. 14'
Third, the statute does not speak in terms of actual intent to carry
out the threat. 14 2 The statute speaks to "knowingly and willfully" mak-
133. Id.
134. Id. at 836-37.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 837.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 836-37.
139. Id.
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1982). Note thatJudge Logan agreed that the very utterance
of a threat is punishable under the statute. Crews, 781 F.2d at 837 (Logan,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
141. Crews, 781 F.2d at 832.
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1982).
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ing a threat. 14 3 Because of the plain language of the statute, the major-
ity would be justified in not considering the actual intent of the
declarant in determining criminal liability.
An argument which was not presented by the dissenting judge, and
not discussed by the majority, is that by definition, a "true threat" may
require actual intent. 14 4 In future cases, rather than arguing a dichot-
omy in the statute, the court, hopefully, will be more explicit in defining
the elements of a "true threat."
5. Conclusion
Crews v. United States leaves the viability for the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege in question. In addition, Crews serves as an example of
what is not protected political speech under the first amendment. It ap-
pears that the appellate court will continue to hold that proof of actual
intent to carry out a threat to kill the President is not necessary.
B. The Heat of Passion Defense
1. Background
The heat of passion defense has been a part of the American legal
system since the 1800's.145 The defense reduces the charge in a homi-
cide from murder to manslaughter. 146 In order for the heat of passion
defense to exist, there are four requirements. 14 7 First, adequate provo-
cation must have existed. 148 Second, one must have killed in the heat of
passion. 149 Third, there must not have been a reasonable opportunity
for the passion to cool.150 Fourth, the provocation, the passion, and the
fatal act must have had a connection.'
5'
If heat of passion is the theory of defense, then the prosecution's
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt becomes an issue. For ex-
ample, to obtain a murder conviction, the prosecution must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully killed another
with malice aforethought. 15 2 In comparison, a voluntary manslaughter
conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
unlawfully killed another without malice and acting "[u]pon a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion."' 5 3 Because of this distinction between mal-
143. Id.
144. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). The Supreme Court stated that
it would not express an opinion as to whether the court of appeals was correct in holding
that a "true threat" did not require proof of intent, thus leaving the door open for pre-
cisely that argument.
145. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 85.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonableness of the
Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (1958).
149. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 85.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 18 U.S.C. § l1ll(a) (1984 & 1985 Supp.).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982).
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ice and heat of passion, the Supreme Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur
that the prosecution must prove absence of the heat of passion on sudden
provocation in order to obtain a murder conviction. 154 The Court
stated that failure to impose this requirement would unlawfully exempt
the prosecution from its burden of proving the defendant guilty of mur-
der beyond a reasonable doubt.
155
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Lofton
The distinction between malice and heat of passion as well as the
requisite jury instructions were the subject of an appeal to the Tenth
Circuit. 15 6 The court held that the trial court failed to adequately in-
struct the jury on the heat of passion defense and its effect on the gov-
ernment's burden of proof.1
5 7
Jessica Mae Lofton fired a .22 caliber revolver into the back of her
husband's head on the morning ofJune 5, 1984; four days later, he died
from the gunshot wounds.' 5 8 The shooting occurred at the Fort Riley
Military Reservation in Geary County, Kansas. 159 Lofton claimed that
she acted in the heat of passion on adequate provocation. 160 She was
found guilty of murder in the second degree under 18 U.S.C. § 11 1 1.161
Lofton appealed her conviction to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 1
6 2
Lofton's first argument was that there was insufficient evidence of
malice to uphold a second-degree murder conviction. 163 Lofton's mo-
tion for ajudgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case was
denied. 16 4 Lofton did not renew the motion at the close of all the evi-
dence. 16 5 The Government argued that Lofton's failure to renew the
motion waived her objection to denial of the motion. 166 The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that even if Lofton had renewed the motion, the record re-
vealed enough evidence of malice to sustain the conviction, without
requiring the court to examine the Government's waiver argument.
167
Lofton's second argument concerned the adequacy of the jury in-
154. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98, 704 (1975), limited by U.S. ex rel. God-
dard v. Vaughn, 614 F.2d 929 (3rd. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 844 (1980).
155. Id.
156. United States v. Lofton, 776 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1985).
157. Id. at 919.
158. Id.
159. Id.








167. Id. Lofton testified that several days before the shooting, she placed the gun in
the car. There was also evidence that she returned to her house to "pick something up"
just before the shooting. In addition, there was testimony that Lofton had told two differ-
ent people shortly before the shooting that she might kill her husband.
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structions concerning her heat of passion defense. 168 Because a crimi-
nal defendant has a right to jury instructions on any defense theory
finding support in the evidence and the law, failure to so instruct would
be reversible error. 169 The Tenth Circuit had previously held that
[A] defendant in a federal murder case who has sufficiently
raised a heat of passion defense is entitled to instructions in-
forming the jury of the theory of defense and of the Govern-
ment's duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of
heat of passion in order to obtain a murder conviction.
170
The record established and the Government conceded that Lofton suffi-
ciently raised a heat of passion defense and was entitled to an
instruction. '
7 '
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit examined the instructions to deter-
mine if the jury was advised of Lofton's defense and its effect on the
prosecution's burden of proof.' 72 The Tenth Circuit found that the in-
structions did not inform or even suggest to the jury that Lofton's sole
defense to murder was that the killing of her husband was in the heat of
passion. 17 3 The manslaughter instruction was the only instruction
which referred to the heat of passion defense, but it did not advise the
jury that this was Lofton's sole defense to murder.' 74 In addition, the
court found that there was no instruction to the jury regarding the Gov-
ernment's burden when a heat of passion defense is raised: that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of
passion. 17 5 Although both "heat of passion" and "malice" were de-
fined, the court was concerned that the instruction did not differentiate
between the two or explain to the jury that finding one necessarily pre-
vented the finding of the other.1
7 6
3. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit has sent a warning to all counsel and trial courts
not to blindly rely on pattern jury instructions. The court expressly af-
168. Id.
169. Bird v. United States, 180 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1901).
170. Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920.
171. Id. at 919. Lofton had testified that her daughter was sexually abused by a friend
while the family was stationed in Germany. Lofton had threatened the abuser with a gun.
Also at that time, Jessica's daughter told her that Ronald, Lofton's husband, had also
abused her, a story which Lofton did not believe. The testimony presented at trial tended
to show that Ronald had sexually assaulted his stepdaughter in January of 1983 in Kansas,
in addition to the Germany incident. Lofton unsuccessfully tried criminal prosecution,
therapy, and separation. Several weeks before the shooting, Lofton found her husband,
Ronald, lifting up her daughter's nightgown. An assistant county attorney declined to
refile aggravated incest charges against Ronald on the morning of the shooting. Angered
by this information, Lofton had asked a friend to take her to her husband. While the
friend drove them around, Lofton and her husband had argued. In the middle of the
argument, Lofton fired a revolver into the back of her husband's head, not once but twice.
d.
172. Id. at 921.






firmed that pattern instructions which may provide valuable guidance to
the courts must still be tailored to the peculiar facts of each case and to
the constitutional minimums required by case law. Trial courts must ex-
plain jury instructions in clear detail so that jurors will know what is
expected of them. Additionally, lawyers must tailor instructions to make
them understandable to the jury.
C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
1. Background of the RICO Act
Congress has attempted to address the problems presented by or-
ganized crime in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). 177 The concept of organized crime, which is normally con-
sidered a multi-faceted criminal undertaking, does not fit neatly into the
common law of conspiracy. 178 In large criminal organizations, similar to
large corporations, each of the members operate on different levels. 179
Therefore, depending on which level the member operates, it is highly
probable that different responsibilities for each member of the conspir-
acy exist. 180 The possibility of different responsibilities and objectives
existing for each level of the organization, requires that each level be
punished according to what each level has sought to accomplish.' 8 1
Otherwise, individual defendants may be prosecuted for the acts of
others, the significance of which the individual defendant might not
have comprehended.1 82 Thus, no matter how large the criminal organi-
zation, criminals could thwart prosecution by playing only a small part in
the larger conspiracy.
Since general conspiracy laws could not curtail such conduct, Con-
gress enacted RICO to stop large scale criminal activity. RICO prohibits
a person from using income derived "from a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity" to acquire, establish, or operate any enterprise which is engaged
in or which affects interstate commerce. 1 83 Second, RICO makes it un-
lawful for any person through a "pattern of racketeering activity" to ac-
quire or maintain any interest in or control over any enterprise which is
engaged in or which affects interstate commerce. 184 Third, RICO for-
bids any person to conduct or participate in managing the enterprise's
177. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). Congress responded to the inadequate enforce-
ment of laws against organized crime by enacting RICO as part of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). See McClellan, The Organized
Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55
(1970). See generally Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM
L. REV. 165 (1980); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291 (1983).
178. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 705. See also Rex v. Meyrick, 21 Crim. App. 94,
102 (1929) (English case); Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, " 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968: Broadest Of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1 (1978).
179. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 1, at 705.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 706.
182. Id.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
184. Id. at § 1962(b) (1982).
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affairs through a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 18 5 Finally, it is un-
lawful to violate any one of the above-mentioned provisions.
186
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion: United States v. Hampton
Since passage of RICO, judicial interpretation of its broad, substan-
tive provisions has been required. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
faced such interpretation during the survey period in the case of United
States v. Hampton.
18 7
Gene Edward Hampton was indicted for misusing his position as
Sheriff of Bryan County, Oklahoma. 18 8 Sheriff Hampton allegedly
would not enforce liquor, gambling, and other laws in exchange for
money from bar owners and club operators. 18 9 A jury convicted Hamp-
ton on nine counts of a ten count indictment.' 90 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit disagreed with all of Hampton's contentions and affirmed his
conviction. 1 9
Hampton based his appeal on issues involving the RICO conspiracy
count. 19 2 Hampton first argued that there was insufficient evidence
presented by the government proving that the designated co-conspira-
tor, Deputy Roy Harris, committed two of the necessary predicate of-
fenses. 193 Hampton claimed that such failure in proof meant that Harris
was not a member of a conspiracy.' 9 4 If Harris was not a member of a
conspiracy, then, Hampton argued, they could not have conspired
together. 1
95
In addressing Hampton's claim, the Tenth Circuit determined that
a substantive RICO provision must be violated in order for a RICO con-
spiracy to exist. 19 6 Using the Bryan County Sheriff's Office to conduct
racketeering activity constituted a substantive RICO offense. 19 7 Merely
conspiring to commit the predicate crimes which establish the pattern of
racketeering activity was not enough. 19 8 Rather, Hampton and Harris,
through the use of the sheriff's office, had to have conspired to engage
185. Id. at § 1962(c) (1982).
186. Id. at § 1962(d).
187. 786 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1986).
188. Id. at 978.
189. Id.
190. Id. The indictment also included six counts of conspiracy in violation of the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982) (counts 3-8) and two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512
(1982 & Supp. I1 1985) (counts 9-10). Hampton allegedly used a "bagman" to collect the
extorted payoffs as well as having the club owners make "donations" to a "Narcotic
Fund." The payments were to ensure non-harassment, remaining open beyond the re-
quired 2:00 a.m. closing time, and the safe operation of dice games. Sheriff Hampton
allegedly directed a deputy, Roy Harris, to terminate a gambling investigation and warned
participants in an ongoing dice game of an impending raid by authorities. Id.
191. Id. at 981.
192. Id. at 978.








in a pattern of racketeering activity.' 9 9 The evidence of the extortion
scheme, the involvement in the gambling operations, and the termina-
tion of an ongoing investigation was more than enough to satisfy the
Tenth Circuit that both conspirators intended to take advantage of the
sheriff's office through a pattern of extortion and other racketeering
activity.
20 0
Next, Hampton argued that serving consecutive sentences for vio-
lating both RICO and the Hobbs Act constituted double jeopardy in
violation of the fifth amendment. 20 1 The Tenth Circuit, in rejecting this
argument, relied on the statutory framework and the legislative history
of RICO. 20 2 According to the court, it was clear that Congress intended
to allow punishment for violations of the substantive RICO provisions as
well as for the commission of the underlying acts. 20 3 The court refused
to hold that a conviction on the underlying acts was absolutely necessary
before one could be convicted under RICO; 20 4 rather, it indicated that a
predicate crime for which the defendant had already been punished was
one of the possible bases for a RICO conviction and subsequent
sentence.
20 5
Hampton also argued the existence of separate conspiracies. 20 6 He.
contended that his mere participation in the conspiracies was not
enough to warrant combining them in a single count.20 7 Therefore, the
combination was, in fact, a charge of multiple conspiracies in a single
count, which is not allowed. 20 8 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment by finding more than just participation as the common element. 20 9
The court found that "[t]he common denominator between the 'kick-
backs,' dice games and other schemes" involved Hampton's participa-
tion as well as the corruption of the Bryan County Sheriff's Office. 210
3. Conclusion
One of the purposes of RICO is to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States. The Tenth Circuit has taken a hard-line ap-
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 980. For a discussion of the Hobbs Act, passed to punish interference with
interstate commerce by extortion, see Stern, Prosecution of Local Political Corruption Under the
Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SEXTON HALL L. REV. 1
(1971).
202. Hampton, 786 F.2d at 980. The court refered to the following cases to show Con-
gress' intent to permit cumulative punishment for substantive RICO violations: United
States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (1 1th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.,
Little v. United States, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
203. Hampton, 786 F.2d at 980.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 980-81.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 981; see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
209. Hampton, 786 F.2d at 981.
210. Id.
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proach in support of the purposes of the Act. The Hampton decision is a
sample of the court's attitude toward patterns of racketeering activity,
regardless of the number of people involved and the scope of the impact
following from that activity. Because of the Tenth Circuit's concern with
organized crime, one should look for the court to continue to broadly
interpret the RICO provisions.
Wendy M. Moser
